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Introduction 
Maj or League Baseball's reentry draft was instituted under the Basic 
Agreement of 1976. This contract marked the end of a roughly ten -y ear 
1 period of increasing dispute between baseball owners and players, and the 
beginning of a significant modification in the labor market arrangements 
that governed the sport . Prior to the 1977 s·eason, 'the reserve clause left 
players ' mobility, and thus bargaining strength, entirely to the discretion 
of the team with which they had signed as rookies. Revision of the reserve 
clause under the 1976 Agreement created a competitive auction market for 
the services of veteran players. To the public eye, the important conse-
~~ences of this reentry marke t have appeared t wofold: 1) escalating player 
salaries; and 2) player reallocations, possibly to the detriment of competi-
tive balance . 
'l'hc1t the f ree agent market has produced some extraorcinary player 
con t racts is not surprising, perhaps not to baseball fans, and certainly 
not to economists . For more thun twenty-five years the econo:nic literature 
has been unswerving in i ts judgment that the original reserve clause was a 
potent source of monopsony power for owners . 2 As such , the recent era of 
''staggering" free . agent contracts largely represents the redistribution of 
Ricardian rents that were previously garnered by owners u~der the reserve 
clause but now accrue to players since the 19i6 Agreement. 7his process of 
re~t redistribution is firmly supported by recent empirical studies. 3 
In contrast, the related issue of free agency and league balance seems 
less cleAr. The belief of the Co:nrnissioner, some owners, and many fans has 
been tr.<1t the re en-cry draft will in time lessen competition . Advocates of 
the reserve clause often claim that larger urban areas, due to their 
greater revenue base, are better positioned to offer lucrative free agent 
2 
contr,1<.:l.s. 'l'he implications an~ increasing disp;iri ty in relative team 
performance, and the likely dissolution of marginal teams in the long run. 
Economic theory, on the other hand, almost uniformly rejects tpis popular 
4 
argument. The theory views the original reserve clause as a mechanism 
which permanently assigns the property rights of players to owners. In the 
absence of° recontracting, the original reserve· clause could assure 
convergence to equal team strength due to the reverse-order rookie draft 
procedure. However, without restrictions on player-cash transactions, 
there was nothing in the original reserve s'ystem implying that player 
allocations, and thus team balance, should differ from that of a 
competitive labor market. Less technically stated, when George 
Steinbrenner wanted Dave Winfield to play for the Yankees, it was 
i1m1aterial from a competitive standpoint whether millions of dollars had to 
be paid to San Diego or . directly to Dave \'{infield. It is in this sense 
that the revision of the reserve system implies rent redistribution, from 
the Padres to Winfield in this case, but not necessarily a different 
distributioP of tulent . 
~hile the economic literature lays a solid theoretical foundation for 
this conclusion, tests of the model's prediction 
5 
are rare. To date, 
empirical verification has been precluded by the: short historical time 
frame of the post free-agent period. However, the conclusion of the 1983 
season marks seven years of baseball under the free-agent regime. Further, 
this time span is roughly comparable to 1969-1976, another unique 
structural period 'in baseball defined by the introduction of four league 
divisions yet predating the reentry draft. For this reason, we would argue 
that relevant intertempor~l comparisons can now be drawn between these 
periods to test whether J.ec1gue balance has in fact remained unaffected by 
free agent activity. 
3 
Thi;. p,1r,cr prc~;cnts the results of scvcr<1l statistical tests compar in g 
competition in the pre-:- and post-free-agent eras. These tests include 
classical as well as non-parametric techniques and ,,:e apply them with two 
distinct concepts of competitive balance in mind . One measure of competi-
tion , and certainly this is the fans ' concern, is on-field performance. 
Therefore, one series of tests examines team winning pe r centages and league 
standings. Our second . measure of compet i tion focuses on team revenue - shares 
in th e industry. The rationale here is simply that name- players, over and 
above their contribution to team perfor.nance, can be a turns tyl e draw and 
thus an asset to a prof it- maximizing fi rm. This revenue perspecti ve is 
useful because it opens up a wide menu of traditional market-structure 
measures by which to assess changes in competition. I t is also prob le matic , 
however, because very few teams disclose financial information. This data 
li~itation requires that annual team revenues be estimated for the 1969-1983 
period . Thoug h merely facilitating to the broader purpose cf this paper , 
we believe that the revenue results, and the estimation procedure co~tained 
thereii, are themselves notable. 
The p&per is organized as follows . Section I describes the estimation 
of tea~ revenues. Section :r discusses methodological issues. Section I!i 
outlines the indices of competition ,,e apply to team revenues and presents 
t~e empirical r esults comparing the pre - and post - f r ee-agent periods. 
Simil.:1rly, Section IV discusses tests and results for team fie l d per for -
mance . A sur..rnary a.nd cone luding rer.iarks app_ear in Section IV. 
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I. Team Revenue Estimation 
The keystone of our estimation procedure is an industry study done by 
Markhar.-, & 'feplitz (1981). This description of baseball'& financial 
structure forms the basis of our team revenue model, but more importantly, 
the st.t:<ly contains detailed financial dz.ta for the 1974-19 80 seasons . 
Though these annual data are aggregated to protect team confident ia lity, 
they provide a useful base for several parameter estimates as well as a 
cross - check for some of our revenue results. · :rollowing Markh~m & Teplitz, 
our team revenue model is specified: 
REVENUE= (AREV, BREV, CREV, PREV) (1) 
where AREV is receipts from attendanc~, BREV is broadcasting .revenue, CREV 
is concession revenue net ·of expenses, and PREV is receipts attributable to 
post-season play. Consider each in turn. 
The algorithm for obtaining. attendance revenue is conceptually 
straight-forward--each team receives .:i share of its home and road gates. A 
tea.~•s revenue thus depends upon its home and road attendance (HATT & RATT), 
a\·erage ticket sales price (TKP) across stadiums, and the league proportions 
for gat0 splits, Formally, HOHE and 3.0AD revenues are estimated as: 
~0:-3 . . = (SPL:T.) (HAT'l' .. * TKP .. ) 
1J J 1J iJ 
ROAD . . = (1-SPLIT.)[ E (HOME1 .) (RATT .. / E RATT1J.)) 1 ] J ,J 1) 
(2) 
(3) 
where i, k, and 1 represent 1-12 temils and j denotes the American or National 
League. h'11ile the home revenue equation follows from a factual definition, 
road revenues could only be approximated indirectly. This is done by 
dividing each team's revenue pool for visitors (Cl-SP LIT.) (HOMEk.) l among 
J J 
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the rc:n,:iining t~r1111::; in the league proportionately by their road attendance 
(RATTi/ [ RATTlj]. 
J;.:k 
All of the variables shown in equations (2) and (3) are readily avail-
bl . h tl . f t ' . k 1 · 6 a e wit 1e exception o earns average tic et sa es price . The diffi -
culty in ob~aining this para mete r is that, even though stadium configurations 
by listed ticket price are known for e<1ch year, the average sales price 
need r.ot be a simple weighted average. Such an average \•.'Ot.:ld only be 
accurnte if tear. ,s sold the same proportion of every seating type . Generally , 
the weighted average understates the actual average price because a greater 
proportior. of t he higher -pr iced box seats tend to be fi lled at st.:b- capacity 
7 
attendance. Tc account for this fact, our estimated average sales prices 
are ~o::iputed under the assumption that the best 30 percent of a stadium ' s 
seats s ell at a rate 15 percent higher tha n the te;:im's season attendance 
rate. Fo r- example, if season attendance for a team represents GO percent 
of seating capacity, 69 percent of the better seats \\'ould be filled as 
8 
compared to roughly 56 percent of the cheaper seats. 
Broadcasting revenue (BREV) is compri$ed · of a local and a net1,;ork 
ccmponer.t. l'~etwork co ntrac ts covering Ga:ne- of - th-=-\ ·1eek, f-'..o!"lday- Night 
Baseball, th~ i1ll - Star Game , anc all post season p l ay are negotiated 
throu gh ·.:he Co::ilnissioner ' s Office ond are held in the 1-'.aj or League Central 
Fund. l,fter ded ucti11g the e xpcr,ses of the Commissioners Office, the Fund 
is distributed between the players' pension fund and the clubs. 9 Local 
television ar. d radio contracts are drawn independently by each team and 
there is no revenue sharing condition, either with players or between 
ch.bs. 'l'he values of all local rights anc the network broadcasting contract 
are reported in an annual feat u re article of Broadcasting Magazine . 10 
E, 
Concession revenue '(CI,:EV) is cxtnipolated from a trend line fitted to 
real per - capita conceGsion revenue· for the 1974 - 1980 period. The estirnat-
i:ig cq1:-:1t:ion for team conces,,jons is then obtained as: 
CRE'l . = [HATT. ) [PCREV1. t] lt l.t (4) 
where FC-REV is the predicted per -c apita concession value of the trend 
regression in nominal dollars, i reflects 1- 24 teams, and t goes from 
1969-1983. ll 
Post - season revenue (PREV) is comprised of attendance and concession 
receipts from the two League Championship series and the v,or ld Series . 
Post-season concessions are obtained in the sar.;e mar.ner as the regular 
season estimates except the per - capitn concession values used in the trend 
regression are calculated from post - season fina n cial and attendance data. 
Post-seaso11 attendance revenue is also obtained in a man~er similar to the 
regular season estim;ites but is more accurate for two reasons. First, 
since the League Championship ilnd l·,orl<l Series games are generally sold 
out , a simple weight _ed average ticket price is appropriate in figuring 
t otal g~tes receipts. Second, there are strict formulas for distributing 
post-season .revenue to the participating clubs . These formulas were 
·a a b 1 • • • o~f· 12 provi e to us y t.1e Com:n1.ss1oner s r ice. 
Estir.iation of ccit:atior. ( 1) for each team in each year yields a reasonable 
approximation of the revenue picture in baseball since 196 ·9. Though 
obviously imperfect for the reasons noted above, various comparisons of our 
revenue estimates with MarkhRm & Teplitz 's study suggest that we are well 
wi thiri a tolerable margin of error. A statistical summary of the team 
revenue results appears in an Appendix for the interested fan. 
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II. Methodological Consideration-s 
In formulating statistical tests, two historical facts had ~mportant 
methodological implications for our study. The first is that 1977, in 
addition to being the first season of free agent services, was an expansion 
year in the American League. The acdi tion of s'eattle and Toronto is 
troublesome because it represents a second contemporaneous shock to the 
competitive environr.ient. This shcc k is especially nettlesome because the 
competitive impact of new firr.is in baseball is ambiguous. While more 
participants in an industry generally suggests greater competition, 
expansion clubs tend to be "cellar-dwellers" for an indeterminate length of 
tir.1e . Therefore, the influence of t! -.e expansion teams has been netted out. 
i·!echanically, t his is done by igr.oring wins and losses against the 
e>:pansion clubs and recalculating the American League winning percentages 
from 1977-1983. '!'hough the need for this adjustment is regrettable, our 
examinntion o: the revised stnndir.gs confirms our suspi cion that conducting 
the analys is w.i.th expansion tea:ns would have unduly attributed 
noncompetitive effects to free ·agency. 
A secon6. event falling wi thin the free ~9ency period is the 1961 
player strike. ':'he irnp0:::-tant implication here is not simply that a full 
third of the regular season was lost, but more critically, there was not 
the uniformity of opposition across teams which a full-season schedule 
purposefully assures. In short, the team standings for 1931 are 
incommensurate with other seasons. For this reason, we dropped 1981 from 
statistical tests conducted with team winning percentages. Regarding 
revenue tests, however, we would argue that 1981 remains a viable datum. 
All of the revenue tests focus on shares rather than totals. Although the 
,-hort01u ··d season cJc-;1rly imp.bes lower tulnl revenues per club, it does not 
follow that relative shares are pi;-edictably affected. 
In a st<1tistical vein, the question arises that the da.ta for our 
e:npirical tests r::ay represent the population, rather than a sample drawn 
from a larger population. rf one defines the universe as those twenty-four 
teams since the leagues were split into four divisions, then our data 
represent the populations for pre- and post-free agency. Statistical tests 
of sig:1i-f icance are irrelevant in this case. The issue is simply whether 
the magnitude of the observed differences denote substantial change. To 
the contrary, one might consider the data as two samples; one representing 
the several dec;:ides over which the original reserve system devc.loped prior 
to the 1976 Agreement, the other representing the period of free agency 
extending well into the future. Under this interpretation, the periods 
1969-1976 and 1977-1983 are app ropriate because of a certain homogeneity, 
but issues of statistical significanc e are relevant. We conduct 
significance test on our results for those readers inclined to the latter 
inte rpr etation . 
II~. Revenue Test and Results 
Ind~strial organization theory offers a nuwher of sur..r:iary measures of 
market structurci. For purposes of co~paring baseball's pre- and post-free 
agent periods, we calculate six concentration indices: 1) four-firm 
concentration ratio, 2) w.arginal concentration ratio, 3) Gini coefficient, 
4) ent-roi:,y index, 5) Hcrfindahl index, and 6) numbers equivalent index. All 
of these indices ernphasi;:e to varying cegrees the number and/or relat _ive 
size of firms in an industry. The specification and brief interpretation 
nf c:;;,c.:h indr~x i~ prescnteu· in 'l'able 1, although the unfamiliar- reader may 
•,•:ish to consult any of sever ,31 good summary discussions of concentration 
13 
r.,0.1sun:s. 
Th~ resul t-s for these indices are reported in Table 2. In terms of 
for:nat, several aspects of the table are noteworthy. First, results are 
presented for the Major Leagues, and individuall; 7 for the American and 
National Leagues. These distinctions are drawn to allow for the fact that 
the Ainerican League has shown gre,-:,ter free agent c1ctivity. Second, for 
purposes of meaningful cor.iparisons, we present the values for each index 
representing the extremes of perfect equality and ine~uality. Third, two 
~~irs of results are reported for each index -- "annual average" statistics 
Yersus "period" statistics . 'l'hese pairs reflect two distinct conceptual 
a?pro~ctcs in calculating a given index . In the former, an index value is 
co~1put1?c fer each year and then averaged over the period. In the latter, 
euch t~um ' s ~verngc market share for the period is corr.puted, and then those 
s1:ai:cs <5r e t.:sed in a single index calculation. Using the Herfindahl Index · 
as an cxan-:;:-.le., the distinction between the annual average versus period 
upproach is forr.1ally expressed: 
Anr.t.:al Average= 
~ ~~ (REV . . /'rREV.) 2J L i =l l.J ] 
j=l 
(5) 
t 
rt 
n l [ (REV .. /TREV.) 
Period= [ j=l l.J J 
i=l t 1 (6) 
·.,·here i deno-=es a team, j is a year, n is the · nuir.ber of teams, and t is the 
nu .-nbe r of years in either the pre- or p_ost-free agent period. The 
'J';il.ilc l: Conccnt.r;:ition ln<liccs B.:iscd on '!'earn Revenue 
Ir.dex 
Four - Firm 
Concentration 
Ratio (CR4) 
11arginal 
Concentration 
Ratio (CPJ.1) 
Gini 
Coefficient 
Entropy 
Ind ex (::;) 
llerfind<lhl 
Inc.ex (H) 
Numbers 
Equivalent 
Index (N) 
· Specification 
Simple summation of the 
market shares of the four 
larges t firms. 
Sur.unation of the market 
shares of fifth through 
eighth largest firms. 
Ratio of the area betwe en 
a Lor enz curve and a dia -
gonal line to the area 
below the diagonal. 
n 
E P. 
i=l 1. log [ ~J 
where p. = i team's share 
and n = 1 number of teams. 
H = 
n 2 
r Cp. l 
i=l 1. 
~here p. = i team's share 
~nd n =1 number of teams. 
t: = 1/H 
Interpretation 
Indicates percentage of the 
market held by four largest 
firms. Index value rises 
with greater concentration . 
Indicates percentage of the 
mar ket held by second four 
largest firms. Index value 
rises with concentration . 
Reflects degree of rearket 
share inequality without 
regard to nurr.ber of firms. 
Index rises fron Oto 1 
with greater inequality. 
Weights larger shares more 
heavily by taking the natural 
log of the firm's share. The 
index rises nonlinearly from 
0 with greater eq~ality. 
Also weights larger share, 
but more heavily than the 
E index. H rises from 0 
to 1 with greater inequality. 
The number of equal - sized 
firms that would render a 
given H value. For exa~ple, 
perfect equality in either 
league implies H = 0 . 083 and 
N = 12. 
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conceptual import:.:ince of examining both results is thc'lt the period app r oach 
,,cljusts for changes in team rank · between years while the annual - average 
basis c.oes not . A priori, if team revenue ranks change s~bstantially 
across years, we expect the period-based indices to reflect greater equality . 
On the other hand, roughly equal values under each method suggest team 
ranks are relatively stable . Finally, note that t - s'tatistics for difference 
tests are reported for the annual-average results. However, also recall 
our prior discussion regc:irding the appropriateness of t-tests if one is 
dealing with populations rather than samples. 
Careful @.XcH:iination of the findings in . Table 2 suggest one general, 
though at th i s point tentative, conclusion. \·,ithin each population, the 
indices consistently show a less equitable distribution of league revenue 
in the post - free - agent period. However, considering the magnitude of 
changes involved, this first ir.ipression should be qualified somewhat. For 
example, observe that for the Major Leagt.es as a whole, the changes are 
neither large nor, in the case of annual-aver;,ige indices, statis t ically 
significant. Examining the leagues separately, however , does suggest that 
the American League revenue pie has been significantly redistributed t oward 
greater inequality since free age11cy . Though prelir..inary, i t is noteworthy 
that the results for the American League, the more ;_,ctive free agent 
league, tend to contradict the economic model ' s prediction of no change in 
competitive balance . 
Though a p~ovocative initial perspective, the revenue redistribution 
reve, ,lcd in Table 2 · intimates, rather than tests, a direct relationship 
between free agent activity by teams and shifting mar~e t shares. To 
address this issue, we hav-e constructed indices of free agent activity by 
tea~ from a comprehensive tracking of player movements through the r eentry 
-r:.1-;.., ! •:' i·.u1.:c~nu c Cc,11<:r'11trntio11 l ndices 11cforc «nd After Free Age ncy 
-
c,~ ... cm-1 Gini r. H N 
MAJOR u::,'\GUES 
!.:quality 16 . 67 16.67 0.000 3.'178 0.0 42 2 4 .00 
Inequality 100.00 0.00 1.000 0.000 1 .000 1.00 
Annual /\ve. 
196~1-76 26.37 19 . 50 0.173 3 . 129 0 . 046 21. 71 
1977 - 83 ?.6. 95 19. 72 0.166 3.122 0 . 047 21.46 
(t - value) (- 0. 64) (- 0 . 55) (-1.48) (1.17) (- 0 . 92) (0.93) 
Period 
1~•69-76 25 . 09 18 . 72 0 . 146 3.144 0.045 22 .36 
1977 - 63 26.0 4 19 .06 0 . 164 3.135 0.046 21. 95 
Al'-tERICAi~ :::,EAGUE 
C::qu.:il.i. ty 33.33 33.33 0 . 000 2.4A5 0.083 12.00 
11,C<;llflli ty 100.00 o.oo 1 .000 0.000 1 . 000 1.00 
Annual ;we. 
1%9 - 76 '11. 79 31. 75 0 .117 2 . 461 0.068 11.42 
197'i-U3 45 . 53 31. 76 0.176 2 . 433 0.092 10 . 84 
(t-valuc) (- 2 . 91*} (- 0.02) (-4 . 32*} (3.99*) (- 2 . 70 *) (3 . 75*) 
Period 
196';)- 76 40.61 ]0.97 0.091 2 . 091 0 . 086 11.66 
1977-83 44 . 16 32 . 27 0.157 2.444 0.091 11.03 
Ni\'l'ION,\L :!:.EI,GUE 
Equ.:ility 33.33 33.33 0 . 000 2.485 0.083 12.00 
!r,equali ty 100.00 0 . 00 1.000 0.000 l . 000 1.00 
A1"1nu<1.l .i\ve. 
1%9 - 76 46.12 29.84 0.179 2 . 432 0.092 10 .84 
1977-83 47.62 29.7.4 0.190 2.425 0 . 094 10.65 
(t - value) (- 1.06) (1.41} (-0 . 78) (0. 76) (- 0 . 92) (0 . 93) 
Period 
1%9-76 44.47 31.17 0.149 2 . 450 0 . 089 11.20 
1977-83 46.01 29. 72 0 . 165 2 . 440 0 . 09 1 10 ·. 94 
* The difference in means is significant at the 99 percent l evel . 
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r.::·.:.:t since 1976. 'l'he indice_s are obtained by ranking players acquired and 
!,)!;t in the r~cntry draft with in three categories: superstar (A), everyday 
player (B) , or spot player (C) • The resulting . indices reflect cumulative 
activity in the free agent marke t through the 1983 season. We consider 
separate l y each team's cumulative gains, losses, and net changes by player 
classification. A summary of these measu res of free agent activity appears 
i.n 'i' able 3. 
To e xamine more thoroughly the impact of free agency in the revenue 
pictcrc, Spear~an rank correlations are performed . Specifically, our 
activity indices are tested for rank correlation with a team's change in 
average reve:,ue -ra nk between the pre- and post-free agent period. A 
positive coefficient for acquisitions and net changes indicates that teams 
which have acquired the most free agents, gross or net, have improved their 
revenue ranks most dr.;ir.iatically. Similarly, if there is a relationship 
between free- .agent activity and revenue gains, a r.egative coefficient would 
be anticipated for player losses. Th<:> results are presented in Table 4. 
Gen~r<'l.lly, the implications of t he rank correlations are ra ther striking, 
thou9!1 r.ot r:ecessn ~ily startling. Note the strong positive and significant 
correlations for both cumulative "A" player acquisitions and net "A" player 
changes, while the influence of all other types of acquisitions appears to 
be innocuous . It is especially interesting that "A" player losses do not 
significantly affect revenue rank. Several explanations suggest themselves 
for thes e .. symme t ric revenue ir. tplications of super~tar transactions . One 
possibility is that teams shop by position. They enter the free agent 
draft to fill a r.eed and certainly would not allow theraselves to lose a 
superst~r unless they already had a viable backup. Alternatively, the very 
infusion of new superstar blood may geperate much more fan excitement than 
is lost by the transfer of a s~perstar with whom the fans have become 
jaded. 
'l'nbl r.: 3: Su1mn,:iry of Fr.::e l\gent l\cti vi ty Indices 
Std . 
'Mean Dev. Min. Max. Suro 
AMERICAN LEAGUE 
Cuir.ulative "An pl ayer a<.~qnisitions 1.58 2. 3'3 0 7 19 
Cumulative "B" player acquisitions 3.08 2 . 19 0 7 37 
Cumulative "C" pla~·e r acquisitions 2.17 1.40 C 5 26 
Cumulative "A" player los~es 1.33 1.61 0 5 16 
Cumulative "B" pl<1yE>r losses 3 . 67 2 . 06 1 ... I 44 
Cumulative "C" player losses 2.25 l. 91 0 5 27 
Cumul;itive r:e t "A" player change 0.25 3.16 - s 6 3 
Cumulative net HBU plAyc~ change - 0.58 3.34 - 6 6 - 7 
Cumulat1ve net "C" player change -0.08 2.15 - 4 3 - 1 
NATI(.)1~1\1., LEAGUE 
Cumulative " A" player acquisitions 0.67 0.96 0 3 8 
Cumulative UB" player acquisitions 3.50 1. 73 1. 7 42 
Cumulc1tive "C" player ar:-quisitions 1.00 0 . 60 0 2 12 
Cur.mlative "f'i" player losses 0 . 92 1.00 0 3 11 
Cumulative "B" player losses 2.75 2 . .;s 0 8 33 
Cumulative "C" pl;:iye r losses 1.00 1. 21 0 4 12 
Cumul;:itive net ''A" player; , change - 0.25 1.5~ - 3 2 - 3 
Cumulative ne·t '' E" player chan<;e 0.75 2.53 - 3 4 9 
Cur.ml;:itivc net "C" pl~yer change 0 . 00 1.13 - 3 1 0 
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Table 4: Sp0.arman Rank Correlations between Change in Revenue 
Ranking and Various Indices of Free Agent Activity 
Cumulative "A" player acquisitions 
Cumulative .. B" player acquisitions 
Cumulative "C" player acq uisi t ions 
Cumulative "An player losses 
Cµmulative "B" player losses 
Cmr.ulative ·•c" player losses 
Cumulative net "A " player change 
Cumulative net ·•au player change 
Cumulative net "C" player change 
* Signific~nt at the 05 percent level . 
** Significant at the 99 percent level. 
0.45909** 
0 . 20728 
0. 20313 
- 0.03253 
0.16323 
- 0 .08554 
0.37589** 
-0.00746 
0.33077* 
IV. Field Performance Test and Results 
Tho:.ic;h ccrt.:tinly correlc1ted, rever,1H? shares are not necessarily a one -
to-one mApping of field perfor.:13nce. Therefore, in addition to the revenue 
picture presentc:c! atove, it is appropriate to examine how free agent acqui -
sitions influence comp~t i live balance . Our first pre~ise is that, if 
league balance is a::::ected, one likely rr.anifcstatio~ will be greater 
inequz.lity, or !:lore accurately, greci.ter dispersion in team standings. To 
test for this possibility, w,: present F- statistics and Gini coefficients 
based on league and divisio n · standings in the pre - and post -fr ee agent 
perioci.s. 
'!'he nature of ~~ports competition lends a p:irticularly intuitive 
rner1ning to both of these measures. First. consider the F-t est. Team 
cor.tests are zero-sum gumes i mplying that the average winning percentage 
for a league or division is nec essar ily 500 . Indeed , this average winning 
percentage is a co.:-.rnon reference point for fans, assessing t heir tea.-n' s 
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per:ormnnct':! ,1:; the clc9rcc to which they ,ire doing _better or worse than 
average. Prom a statistical standpoint, greater inequality in team sports 
i r..vlics sreatcr _dispersion around the mean performance of 500 . · Therefore, 
a comparison of variance in team standings is one method of c.etecting a 
lesseni ng of competition in the post-free-agent period. The application of 
ti: c Gini coefficient is conceptually similar . Intuitively, perfect equality 
i::tplies that each team wins, as well as loses, an equal percentage of total 
~~~ss played , thus implying a Lcrer.z curv~ coincident ~ith the 45° diagonal 
c:iC 2. G.:.ni ccef:icier,t of zero . The Gini is actually just another measure 
cf dispersicn where deviations from the mean are weighted equally. 
Tab ::..(: 5 cont;iins the test statistics. The F-test is f (irr.iulated under 
t::e :·,u.ll r.~•potnesis of no declifle in competitive balance. Defining the 
F- stati~tic as the rntio o f post- to prc-freP ngent varia nces , the critical 
va lt:.e of !'" 2.t the 95 po::rccnt significance level is l. 65. Regarding the 
r.1ean Gir.i st,,tintics, these are co~puted hy the annual aver;:ige approach to 
.::ccc::-.:;:o(::" :·c:: :.- tests . 'i'urr.ing to the table, the render may co:-ifirm that the 
res ults t:.,ifor.;r.ly support the null hypothesis of no decline in field 
cor.:petition between the two periods. These findings are thus consistent 
Ki th the predictio;;s of the tr,:1di tional ccononic model that the free ;;gent 
r.ar~:c:. l~us not rt:!ciuced competition as mensurcd in tc:::1ns of greatc::- disper -
s io~ in le,:1gue standings. 
The preceding tests are developed from the prer.iise that, if the 
::--;?e::t::.:y dr uft is no:1co1:1petit:i.ve, the t(:e.:isurable affect ,..:ill be winning 
te<1::ls increasing their r.iargin of dominance over loi:;ers . However , an 
equaliy plausiblP- effect is that free agency influences the order rather 
tha:. the dispersion of team standings. To test this hypothesis, we again 
use the Spearman rank technique and the indices of free agent activity 
'l'.:i.ble 5: 'l'e~rn Con1peti tion t•:easures Defore and After Free Agency 
Std. Div. of Mean Gini · 
Standings Coefficient 
CF test) (t test) 
AllERICl,N LEAGUE 
1969 - 76 71.42 0.078 
1977 - P.3 75.14 0.082 
(test stat . ) (1.11) (- 0.50) 
El,ST 
1969 - 76 73.80 0 .077 
1977 -83 68.20 0.066 
( test stat . ) (0.85) (0.91) 
WEST 
1969 - 76 69.18 0.073 
J.977-8 3 74. 72 0.081 
(test stat.) (1.17) (-0.90) 
NATIONAL Ll::AGUE 
1%9 - 76 73.99 0.080 
1977 - 83 62.79 0.070 
(test st,,t.) (0. 72) (1.46) 
EAST 
19(.9 -76 67 .28 0.067 
1.977-83 66.04 0 . 069 
(t<?St Gt ,, t.) (0.96) (-0.16) 
\.:EST 
1969-76 80 . 63 0.084 
1977-83 60.27 0.062 
(test zlat.) (0.56) (2 .79) 
Note: A one-tfliled test was employed where the alternative hypothesis 
states that competition lessened. Had a two - tailed test been used, 
competition in the National League West \•:ould have been demonstrated 
to increase nt the 9Si l evel for both me-'lsures. 
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•rable 6: Spearman Rank Correlations between Change in Team 
Standings and Variou~ Indices of Free Agent Activ ity 
Division LeaguE! 
Cumulative IIA' ' player acquisitions 0.55867 ** 0.58353 ** 
Cumulative "B" player acquisitions 0.14086 0.09462 
Cumulative "Cu player acquisitions 0 . 0376 3 -0. 04663 
Cumulative "A" p la yer losses - 0 . 22067 - 0 . 26117 
Cumulative "B " play.e r losses - 0 . 18 334 - 0;14338 
Cumulative "C" player losses - 0.36881* -0 . 425~ 6** 
Cumulative net "A" player change 0 .4 8704 ** 0.51999** 
Cumulative r,et " B" player change 0 .1 6382 0.12588 
Cumulative net "C" player change 0. 48823 ** 0 . 48656 ** 
developed in Section III. Specifically , we examine the rank correlation 
between tile activity indices and t he change in teams' average ord er of 
finish between the pre- and post-free agent periods. The results of this 
~est arc presented in Table 6 . Contra r y to the tradi~ional economic 
prediction , free asent acquisitions appear to have ~layed an i~portant role 
in improving team periorrr.ar.ce. For example , obse r ve that the correlation 
coefficients for "A" player-gains, cumulative and ne t, are high and signi -
ficant in both the leagu e and divisional context . However, it is cur i ous 
that "C" player losses and net gains also appear highly and significantly 
correlated with ir.iprovecl field performance. This seems especially . odd 
considering that neither "C" player - gains no r "B" player transactions in 
gener<ll zppear to have any impact. In any event , considered broadly, the 
r.?sul ts suggest. a greater interaction bet ween the free * ent market and 
performanc\" ~ th;,n the tn:iti i ::ion al model predicts. 
15 
v. Summary and Conclusions 
'l'his p;:iper has examined the ef f ects of the players' reent.ry draft on 
the competitive structure of Major League Baseball. Viewed from either a 
field performance or rev enue perspective, we find that free agent activity 
does track structural shifts in baseball since the· 1976 Basic Agree:nent. 
Specifically, revenue shares and changes within leag~e standings are shown 
to be positively and sign ificantly correlated with "A" player acquisitions. 
7~ough c-,m:· test methodology does not allow other explanatory variables to 
e:-,ter the . analysis, the eir,pirical results are nevertheless strong and 
:~nrkedly ;-:t odds with the tradition,:11 economic model's prediction of no 
change i n competitive balance • 
. In a theoretical context, our results seem to suggest that where the 
::raditional model breaks down is that the level of cash-player transactions 
under the original reserve system was apparently insufficie nt to bring 
about t.he competitive market result. A strong justification for this 
:.,ossibili. ty has been suggested by Daly and Moore [1981]. They maintain 
that casl: trans-c1ctions were indeed rare prior to the cir aft, a fact they 
attribute to a si:rong implicit anti-raid contract between owners which was 
fr.1cilit;ite d . by the reserve-player rule. However, the revision of the 
reserve clause , and the rent redistribution that it has clearly wrought, 
has perhaps reduced the benefits of cooperation while raising the costs. 
If so, th e subtle ye t critical effect of a well-orga nized auction market 
for top personnel may have been to strain the limits of ;in implicit cartel 
agreement. Though preliminary, our findings clear~y indicate that there 
are ample performance and revenue incentives to ~efect frora such an implicit 
contract in the post-free agent period. In a popular sense, the defectors 
are those owners who have been especially active in the free agent market. 
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J\ppcn<l:i.x: Esti mated c;ross Rev0.nu e --Rc1nkin9$ by Team ;:ind Year; 
Mear.s, Hinima, and Maxima ($ millions) by Year 
1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
13 15 15 19 21 22 20 21 19 20 11 13 13 
6 9 10 9 10 6 4 5 5 4' 4 6 5 
23 21 23 2 1 23 16 19 , -.._ I 22 22 . 21 20 18 
8 7 9 4 7 13 12 8 12 7 14 9 8 
19 19 22 24 20 21 11 20 20 11 10 11 15 
9 12 13 14 14 9 7 3 2 2 2 1 2 
17 13 J7 17 17 19 14 16 11 10 6 10 11 
20 22 18 13 15 18 21 14 6 12 16 16 14 
18 24 .., .. ... 23 12 12 10 6 6 6 7 5 10 
10 14 19 18 19 23 22 22 15 23 20 23 23 
14 18 16 8 8 10 9 18 24 24 24 24 6 
16 17 20 20 22 15 13 12 17 14 17 18 17 
7 10 11 11 11 17 16 11 9 9 13 15 19 
11 8 12 12 13 ·14 17 23 10 16 8 7 3 
l ). l 1 2 4 5 7 13 17 22 17 16 
22 20 3 6 4 3 3 2 3 3 1 .., <. ¼ 
21 6 4 7 . 9 8 8 13 14 19 12 12 20 
5 4 7 10 6 5 6 9 7 13 15 14 12 
4 11 14 16 18 11 · 23 15 21 21 23 21 21 
15 2 5 2 1 2 1 1 4 5 5 8 9 
3 5 8 5 5 7 18 19 . 16 18 9 4 7 
.., 
,_ 3 2 3 3 1 2 4 1 1 3 3 1 
24 23 2'1 22 24 20 15 1.0 18 15 18 22 24 
12 16 6 15 16 24 24 ? • _ ... 23 8 19 19 22 
4.7 5 . 2 5.5 5.3 5.9 5.8 6.2 6.9 8.3 9 . G 10.9 12.3 9.3 
2.8 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.7 3 . 8 4.3 4.2 4.7 4.2 7.0 5.2 
8 . 4 10.5 9.1 · 8 . 8 9 . 7 11.2 12 . 3 13. 2 15.8 18.9 17.8 21.9 18.6 
1982 1983 
15 7 
8 13 
22 23 
10 12 
7 5 
2 1 
5 6 
17 8 
9 14 
23 24 
14 21 
20 15 
19 16 
3 4 
12 10 
4 3 
24 22 
6 9 
11 11 
16 20 
13 18 
1 2 
18 17 
21 19 
15.2 17.6 
9.8 9.8 
24 . 2 30 . 7 
NO'l'F.S 
1. For a concise hictorical account of the developments leading up to the 
1976 r:,rnic l\gre• :ment, see J. R. llill & t-7. Spellman (19S3,_ pp. 1-21]. 
.., 
,4.•. 'l'his p..:-i11t: w.--1s first discussed by 1,ottenb<?r~i 11956) and given more 
for1:1a.l e~:position by El-i-iodiri & Quirk [1971). Crude estimates of the 
rate of exploitaticn under the reserve systen were obt:.ained by Scully 
[ 1974). 
3. For c:rn:nple, see Cassing & Douglas [1981), Sommer' & Quinton [1982), 
.3.nd llill & Spellman [ 1983) . 
4. J\gc:iin, Rottenberg and El-l!odiri & Quirk provi<le the most cooprehensive 
trN1 t ments of th1, issue. However, Hunt & Lewis [ 1976 ) d~ve lo p an 
int er c5ting concep t cf the optimal degree of dominance by a profit-
maximizin g team. They conclude that there ~re no profit incentives 
.!:l, :: r. level of team dominance c;reater than that experienced in major 
le~s~~ b~sebal l between 1969-1974, thus predicting that a free agent 
market \,·ould not produce a flurry of recontracting likely to alter 
competitive balance. In a different vein, Holahan [19781 presents 
a th12:oretical discussion of the impact of free agency on the marginal 
franchise. 
5. To our knowledge, only Daly & Moore [1981} examine the issue of player 
r eallocation si11ce the reentry draft. '!'hough they cnl y examine three 
years of free agent activity, they find that roughly two-thirds of the 
players signed with tear.is in SMSA regions larger than the team they 
left. P.owevcr, they do not examine any issues related to subsequent 
team pcrfonuance. 
6. Home and road atte:ic!ance is reported in the American League Red Book 
a.lld t:1~ ::a.:io:ial League Green Book. 7'•.nnual ticket prices and stadium 
con~is~r~tio:is are contained in the Of:icial Baseball Dope Bock. In 
the Arnr:ricar. Leayue, the home/visitor gate split is 80/20, 
respt:!ctively. In the National League, the gate split is a fixed 
amount per turnstyle cour.t 011 .:ickets over $1. 00. Since 1969, this 
distribution ha.s ranged fror., 36 -54 cents per head. !iistorically, 
hov:evt:)r, the gate split !1as amot:r.ted to a roughly 90/10 percentage 
spli~ (sec Markham & Teplitz, p. 92). 
7. 'This point was stressed by sever;,il teams' ticket rnar,a~ers with who=n 
we corrcspo:idcd du~ing our riata collection. Across teams , season 
,;tt0n: ;;~c0 ;1s .:i pen::e11tt19e of stadium capacity ranged roughly from 
& l e~ 30 ~o a high of 90 percent . 
8.. Whf l~ attendance revenue figures are not avaflable by team, t-:arkham 
& Teplitz (pp. 148, 160) provic1€ total Major League attendance revenue 
for e~ch of the years 1974-1980. We employed a least -squares tech-
nique for these seven years to estim~te the fill - rate para.-neters. 
<). Ovnr. t h ,~ pe rio d l !)'/S- 1977, n0two r k broodc ;1r;ting contracts tota l crl 
$ ✓, ] . ·, million. 'l'h<~ Con1111i:~"ioner ' s e~:p<!ns0.s conl"-Ut.'it'd 10 percent, with 
40 pe rc c 11t of th0 rc i;idual allot t ed to th e player pension fund and 60 
percent being split equally among the clubs (Markha m & Teplitz, p. 45). 
In the subsequent years, however, the network contracts have.soared. 
It thus seemed inappropri8te to set the Commissio .n 's sh~re at a con -
stant 10 percent . Instead, the Commission ' s e}:penses were allowe d to 
rise at the annual rate of the GNP deflater and this amount was 
<1.llotted out of the network contract with the residual being disbursed 
according to the 40/60 rule . 
10. Cross-checking the actual local broadcasting totals reported by 
Markham & Teplitz (p. 148, 160) with those in Bro adcasting Magazine 
indicated that local contracts tended to be slightly over - reported. 
Comparisons sugge s t ed a factoring of 0 . 86. 
11 . ";hi s procedure i s apparently flaweci by the fact tr.at co:1cessio:, 
arrang ements ,"\re kno\m to vary across clubs. For example, l·!arkharn 
& Te9litz note that some clubs exchange all or part of their 
concession rights for lower stadium rent. This fact ir.-,plies that 
our value for PCREV is J-,iased downward because the per car,,ita con-
cession fiqure is b2.sed on baseball attendance, includina c l ubs that 
r eport no ~or.ces s ion revenue. t-'.ul tiplying team att.endan~e by FCREV 
will then und, ?rstate accounting revenue for franchises with full 
concession righ t s and clearly overstate the others. However, this 
procedure is really only flawed from a1~ accounting perspective . 
We are focusing on revenue figures primarily because expenses are 
even more zealously guarded. Since we ~innot net stadium rent out 
of every team ' s revenue, we believe it appropriate to ir:,pute con-
cess i on revenue to those teams which forsake this revenue source f or 
better rent arrangements which other teams do not enjoy. 
12. Fo:?:" the Leas-u~ Championship Series, the t\,O participoting clubs in 
eaci: league split equally 40 percent of the gate receipts for the 
first three gc:.:.nc s and 100 pe:?:cen t oi the gate when a fot:.rth or fifth 
gar::e is n.ecessary. In the \•:orl d Series , the two c l ubs split 17 per-
cent of the gate f0r the fi r st four games and 42.5 percent of the gate 
in the event of a fifth through seventh game . 
13. Sec i\sch . (1983, f'P • 125 - 13 •1) or Scherer (1980, pp. 56-60) . 
REFEHENCES 
1. l\sch, P. , Industrial Organizntion and Antitrust Poli,c y, New York, 
John Wiley & Sons , 1983. 
2. Cassing, ~ - and R. w. Douglas , "I mplications of the Auct i on 
Mechanism in naseball ' s Free Agent Draft, " S0t 1 thern Economic Journal , July 
1981, 47, 110-121. 
3. Daly, G. and W. J. Moore, "Externalities, Prope rty Rights, and 
the Allocation of Resources in Major League Baseball ," Economic Inquiry , 
January. 1961, 19, 77-95. 
4. Sl - Hodiri, M. and J. Quirk , "Ar. Economic Model of a Professional 
Sports League," J c\1rnal of Political Economy, " ?-;ov/Dec 1971, 1302-1319. 
5 . r:ill, ,J. R. and\·/. Spellman , "Professional Baseb;,11: The Reserve 
Clause and Salnry Structure ," Industrial Rel~tions , Winter 1983 , 22, 1-19 . 
6. ficl;,ihG.n, \·! . L. , "The Long-Run Effects of Abolishing the Bas eball 
Player Reserve System! " Journal of I~gal Studies, 1978, 19, 129 - 137 . 
7. Hunt, J. W. and K. A. Lewis, "Domihance, Recontracting, ar.d the 
Reser ve Clause: r-:ajor Ler.1s-ue Baseball," American Economic Review, December 
1976, 66, 936 - 943. 
8. Markham, J. w. and -r . V. Teplit~, Ra~eball fconomics and Public 
Policy, Lexington , ;,1A, Lex:i.ngtcn Books , 1981. 
9. Rottenberg, S., "The Players' Labor Market, " Journal of Pclitical 
Economy , J une 1956, 64, 242-258. 
10. Sc::erer, F. ,. ~·1 • I ! ndt,s t riul ::a:::,;,et Stn:cture a:1d Eccnomic 
F0rf0rma~ce , Chicaso, Ran McNally, 1980. 
11. Scully, G. ri., "?ay and Perfonnance i n tlajor Le ague Das.eball, " 
~1Rrican fconoraic Review , December 1974, 64 , 915 - 930 . 
12. Sor..-r.ers, P. M. and N. Quinton, "Pay and Perfon1ance in !!ajor 
League Baseball: The Case of the First Fa mi ly of Free ·Agents," Journal of 
llurnan Resources , September 1982, 17, 427 - 435. 
13. ~~erican League Red Book, Los Ange l es , CA. , various editions, 
1970 - 1983. 
14. 8 roadcasting i-:aga::i ne, Washington , D. C ., various issues, 
Feb/March, 1970 - 1983. 
15. The Official Baseball Dop«:> Book, St. Louis, MO. , various 
editions, 1969 - 1983. 
16. National l,er1gue Green nook , Los Angeles , CA. , various edit ion s, 
1970 -1 963. 
